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RULE 90)1 - IS REQUIRING A PLAINTIFF IN A MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTION TO CERTIFY HIS OR HER CLAIM
BEFORE FILING UNCONSTITUTIONAL? - THE ISSUE IN
ANDERSON v. ASSIMOS2
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 90) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure restricts
an individual's right to file a malpractice claim against a provider of
health care.3 A plaintiff must certify in the complaint that the medical
care at issue has been "reviewed by a person who is reasonably
expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of
Evidence and who is willing to testify that the medical care did not
comply with the applicable standard of care."4 If the certification
requirement is not complied with, the complaint must be dismissed.5
In October 2001, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Ander-
son v. Assimos addressed whether Rule 90) was constitutional.6 The
majority held that the statute violates the "due course of law" provision
of article 1, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution.7 The major-
1. N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j) provides, in pertinent part:
(j) Medical Malpractice - Any complaint alleging medical malpractice in
failing to comply with the applicable standard of care ... shall be dismissed
unless: (1) The pleading specifically asserts that the medical care has been
reviewed by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert
witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to testify
that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care; (2)
The pleading specifically asserts that the medical care has been reviewed by a
person that the complainant will seek to have qualified as an expert witness
by motion under Rule 702(e) of the Rules of Evidence and who is willing to
testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of
care, and the motion is filed with the complaint; or (3) The pleading alleges
facts establishing negligence under the existing common-law doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 90) (1999).
2. Anderson v. Assimos, 146 N.C. App. 339, 553 S.E.2d 63 (2001), vacated 356
N.C. 415, 572 S.E.2d 101 (2002).
3. Id.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1, Rule 90)(1) (1999).
5. Id.
6. 146 N.C. App. at 342, 553 S.E.2d at 66.
7. The North Carolina Constitution provides, "[a]ll courts shall be open; every
person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be administered without
favor, denial, or delay." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
219
1
Wood: Rule 9(j) - Is Requiring a Plaintiff in a Medical Malpractice Act
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2003
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
ity also held the regulation violates the equal protection clauses of both
the federal" and state9 constitutions.
In November 2002, the Supreme Court of North Carolina con-
cluded the Court of Appeals improperly addressed the constitutional-
ity of Rule 90) and dismissed Anderson's appeal.' The certification
requirement is not implicated in medical malpractice actions unless
the plaintiff attempts to establish the defendant failed to adhere to the
appropriate standard of care. 1' Res ipsa loquitur was the basis of
Andersen's negligence claim so the court determined the certification
requirements were not applicable. 12 Because the requirements were
inapplicable, the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the constitution-
ality of Rule 9(j). 3 Accordingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court
vacated the appellate court's holding that Rule 9(j) violates article 1,
section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clauses of the North Carolina and United States Constitutions. 14
This note will examine the North Carolina Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in Anderson v. Assimos. Part II of the note presents the factual
background, the issue raised, and the holding in the Anderson deci-
sion. Part III analyzes the decision and discusses why the court's hold-
ing is correct. This note concludes that the North Carolina Supreme
Court should hold that Rule 9(j) unconstitutionally infringes upon
8. The United State Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. The North Carolina Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties
or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to
discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
N.C. CONST. art I, § 19.
10. See Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 417, 572 S.E.2d 101, 103 (2002).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See State v. Crabtree, 286 N.C. 541, 543, 212 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1975)
(constitutional questions may only be addressed when a case cannot be resolved
otherwise).
14. 356 N.C. at 417, 572 S.E.2d at 103.
[Vol. 25:219
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RULE 90)
rights guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions if asked
to addresses the issue in the future.
1I. ANDERSON V. ASSiMOS
A. Factual Background
In August 1996, Margaret Wrenn Anderson went to the emergency
room at North Carolina Baptist Hospital to be treated for a kidney
problem.' 5 She became slightly dizzy after being given the drug
gentamicin, but she was released by the hospital and she returned to
her home.' 6 After trying to walk down a hallway in her home, Ander-
son staggered.' 7 She grew dizzier, became extremely nauseous, and
vomited seven or eight times. 8 Anderson described her condition as
feeling as if she were drunk. 19 "Her ears felt like she was in an airplane
and they were pushing out. '"20 Anderson had never experienced this
problem with her ears before or "the symptoms of dizziness related to a
drunken feeling that she felt when she tried to do anything."21
Upon the continuation of these problems after her visit to the hos-
pital, Anderson was taken, in a wheelchair, to see Dr. Assimos, the
physician treating her kidney disorder at Baptist Hospital.22 Dr.
Assimos assured Anderson that nothing was medically wrong with
her.23 When Anderson's nausea and dizziness persisted, Anderson
immediately went to Duke Hospital.24 Anderson's son had to wheel
her into the hospital because the dizziness and drunkenness rendered
her unable to walk.25 Physicians at Duke Hospital ran a series of tests
on her, but they did not prescribe any treatment or medication.26
After her examination at Duke, Anderson returned to Baptist Hos-
pital at Dr. Assismos' request where she remained hospitalized for sev-
eral days in September 1996.27 After extensive testing, physicians at
15. 146 N.C. App. at 340, 553 S.E.2d at 65.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
2003]
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Baptist Hospital informed Anderson that she had suffered a stroke.28
She was subsequently released from the hospital.29
Around the first of October 1996, Anderson saw Dr. Brown at
North Carolina Baptist Hospital.30 During medical testing, Dr. Brown
placed water in Anderson's ears, but she could not feel it.3 1 While
attempting to discover the cause of Anderson's problems, Dr. Brown
inquired into what medications Anderson had been administered.32
Dr. Troost, another physician at North Carolina Baptist Hospital,
examined Anderson and informed her that she had an equilibrium
problem and that the gentamicin "had burned out her ear."'33 Dr.
Assimos subsequently confirmed that gentamicin was responsible for
Anderson's condition.34
On August 17, 1999, Anderson filed a complaint alleging medical
malpractice by Dr. Dean George Assimos, Dr. R. Lawrence Kroovard,
Dr. Mark R. Hess, Wake Forest University Physicians, Wake Forest Uni-
versity Baptist Medical Center, The Medical Center of Bowman Gray
School of Medicine, North Carolina Baptist Hospital, and The North
Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. for failing "to adequately and properly
and fully inform[ I her of' known risks associated with the gentamicin
administered to her.35 Anderson also alleged res ipsa loquitur in her
complaint.36 On August 23, 1999, Anderson filed a motion to "extend
the statute of limitations for a period of 120 days to file a complaint in
medical malpractice conforming to . . .Rule 9(j) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure as [it] relate[s] to medical malpractice actions. ' 37 Ander-
son's amended complaint, filed November 10, 1999, detailed the medi-
cal treatment Defendants provided and her subsequent symptoms. 38
Anderson alleged that (1) her injuries were caused by being treated
with gentamicin, (2) "ear burn-out" was a known side-effect of the
drug, (3) the side effect had previously occurred in other patients at
North Carolina Baptist Hospital, (4) Defendants did not warn her of
the potential side effect, and (5) Defendants did not monitor the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 146 N.C. App. at 340, 553 S.E.2d at 65.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
222 [Vol. 25:219
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss2/4
RULE 9()
gentamicin when a monitoring process was available to prevent the
side effect. 39
Before filing her complaint, Anderson, an elderly woman with a
limited income, tried to comply with the pre-filing certification require-
ment.4 ° Although Anderson gave her medical file to an expert for
review, she was unsuccessful in obtaining an expert witness because
the witness would have to testify that the Defendants had improperly
applied the necessary monitoring test, a test the Defendants had not
performed at all.41
On November 16, 1999, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss
Anderson's complaint for failing to comply with Rule 90) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.42 The Superior Court of Guilford
County granted Defendants' motion.4 3
B. The North Carolina Court of Appeals' Decision
1. Res Ipsa Loquitur
On October 2, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to
Anderson's medical malpractice action.44 For res ipsa loquitur to
apply, a plaintiff must establish, without expert testimony, that an
injury would not normally have occurred unless the defendant was
negligent. 45 The jury must be able to infer, "through common knowl-
edge and experience[,]" that the defendant's negligence caused the
injury.46 Because the side effects of gentamicin and failure to monitor
those effects are not "within a jury's common knowledge or experi-
ence," expert testimony would be required to "establish the standard
of care to be used" in administering gentamicin and to establish that
Defendants breached that standard.47 Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was inapplicable to Anderson's medical malpractice action. 48
39. 146 N.C. App. at 341-42, 553 S.E.2d at 66.
40. 146 N.C. App. at 342, 553 S.E.2d at 66.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 146 N.C. App. at 343, 553 S.E.2d at 67.
45. Diehl v. Koffer, 140 N.C. App. 375, 536 S.E.2d 359 (2000).
46. 140 N.C. App. at 379, 536 S.E.2d at 362.
47. 146 N.C. App. at 343, 553 S.E.2d at 67.
48. Id.
20031
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2. Rule 90)
The Court of Appeals also addressed whether the pre-filing certifi-
cation requirement violates both the North Carolina and United States
constitutions.4 9 The court reversed the dismissal of Anderson's action
for failing to comply with Rule 9(j) and remanded the case to the trial
court.50 The Court of Appeals held the pre-filing certification require-
ment is unconstitutional, and therefore void, on two grounds.5 ' First,
it unduly restricts access to the courts by impairing the right to file a
medical malpractice action and therefore it violates article 1, section
18 of the North Carolina constitution.52 Secondly, Rule 9(j) runs afoul
of the federal and state equal protection clauses.53
a. Access to the courts - open courts guarantee
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals stated that the "due course of
law" provision of article 1, section 18 does not permit the General
Assembly to deny an individual "the opportunity to be heard before
being deprived of property, liberty[,] or reputation, or having been
deprived of either," deny that individual "a like opportunity [for]
showing the extent of his injury" or deny that individual a sufficient
remedy. 54 The court held Rule 9(j) unconstitutionally restricts access
to the courts because it "impairs [and] unduly burdens ... the filing of
any medical malpractice claim."55 A law is unduly burdensome when
its goal or "effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path" of one
"seeking to exercise her constitutional right. ' 56 As further support of
the burden and harshness Rule 9(j) imposes, the court noted that an
injured individual is entirely precluded from filing a medical negli-
gence claim where he or she cannot "timely find an expert", lacks
"funds to employ. .. an expert", or cannot find an attorney willing to
lend him or her funds to obtain an expert. 57 Moreover, the court noted
that where an expert is retained, the certification requirement erringly
gives the expert, not the judicial system, the right to determine whether
an injured individual may present his or her claim to the court.58
49. 146 N.C. App. at 342, 553 S.E.2d at 66.
50. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 146 N.C. App. at 343, 553 S.E.2d at 67.
55. 146 N.C. App. at 344-45, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
56. 146 N.C. App. at 345, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
57. Id.
58. Id.
[Vol. 25:219
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b. Equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions
Open access to courts is a fundamental right, and because the
court held Rule 9(j) infringes upon that right, the equal protection
clauses of both the federal and state constitutions are implicated.59
Accordingly, legislation limiting access to courts can be maintained
only when it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest. 60
Defendants asserted that Rule 90) obviates "frivolous lawsuits",
thereby promoting a compelling state interest.6 ' However, the court
concluded that the record did not lend support to the claim that frivo-
lous medical malpractice actions were a problem before Rule 9(j) was
enacted.62 There was insufficient evidence to support the proposition
that the rule alleviates frivolous litigation, assuming such a problem
exists.63 Likewise, there was no evidence that the fear of frivolous liti-
gation was limited to medical malpractice actions, yet it is the only
action that requires an expert certification before the filing of the
claim. 64 However, even assuming arguendo that frivolous lawsuits are
isolated to medical malpractice actions, the court concluded that Rule
90) was not "the least restrictive method" for eliminating the prob-
lem. 65 The court noted that numerous states merely require a medical
review panel to review a claim before a medial malpractice action can
be filed.66 Review panels effectively "[weed] out frivolous" claims and
through using the panels, frivolous lawsuits can "discouraged" without
denying access to the courts. 6 7 Because Rule 9(j) does not implement
the least restrictive alternative to prevent frivolous litigation, the Court
of Appeals held it violates the equal protection clause of both the fed-
eral and state constitutions and is therefore void.68
III. ANALYSIS
A. Open Access to Courts
Article 1, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution expressly
prohibits the state legislature from enacting a statute that hinders an
59. 146 N.C. App. at 345, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
60. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
20031
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individual's right to recover for injury to his reputation, person, or
property. 69 The article guarantees "U]ustice would be available to all
who were injured; to this end, the courts would be 'open'."70 The "due
course of law" provision of section 18 allows the General Assembly to
"define the circumstances under which a remedy is legally cognizable
and those under which it is not."' 7 1 Permissible attempts of defining
such situations include abolishing or altering an unvested claim,72
establishing a statute of limitation, 73 statute of repose,74 rules of pro-
cedure,75 and granting or denying immunity in certain situations.76
However, Rule 9(j) does more than merely attempt to define the cir-
cumstances under which legal relief will be available to one injured by
medical malpractice; the statute goes far beyond restricting an injured
party's ability to seek redress. It unduly restricts an injured party's
access to the courts in direct violation of article 1, section 18.
The pre-certification requirement "place[s] a substantial" and
sometimes insurmountable "obstacle in the path" of one "seeking to
exercise her constitutional right. '78 The statute completely bars recov-
ery to victims of medical negligence who lack sufficient financial
resources to hire an expert to review the claim and testify that the med-
ical treatment rendered did not comply with the proper standard of
care. Thus, the injured party is denied his or her day in court and
thereby deprived of a remedy by due course of law as guaranteed by
the North Carolina Constitution.7 9
Moreover, cases in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
do not need expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of
care and the defendant's potential breach of that standard.8 ° When
negligence and malpractice are obvious and within the jury's "com-
mon knowledge and experience,"81 there is absolutely no need to
69. Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904).
70. John V. Orth, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 54 (1993).
71. Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 444, 302 S.E.2d 868, 882
(1983).
72. Pinkham v. Unborn Children ofJather Pinkham, 227 N.C. 72, 40 S.E.2d 690
(1946).
73. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981).
74. Lamb, 308 N.C. at 444, 302 S.E.2d at 882.
75. Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App. 592, 306 S.E.2d 477 (1983).
76. Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985).
77. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
78. 146 N.C. App. at 345, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
79. See id.
80. See 146 N.C. App. at 342-43, 553 S.E.2d at 66-67.
81. 140 N.C. App. at 379, 536 S.E.2d at 362.
[Vol. 25:2 19226
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require pre-certification as a requisite to filing a medical malpractice
claim. The pre-filing certification requirement wastes the plaintiffs
time and money. More proof is required to file the claim than is
required to satisfy the burden of proof in reaching a verdict. Accord-
ingly, the pre-certification requirement unquestionably "place[s] an
substantial obstacle in the path "of one "seeking to exercise her consti-
tutional right.
8 2
Rule 9(j) also imposes an undue burden on a plaintiff because an
injured party may have difficulty in timely finding an expert willing to
testify that the defendant was negligent.8 3 Physicians may often hesi-
tate or refuse to testify against another physician's treatment, even if
the treatment was negligently rendered. Physicians may chose to defer
out of respect for a peer, fear of criticism from co-workers, apathy, or
various other reasons. Moreover, some medically induced injuries
may not be detected until years after the treatment is rendered. A vic-
tim who does not discover the injury until shortly before the statue of
repose runs may be precluded from filing the claim if he or she
encounters difficulty in obtaining an expert to testify that the treat-
ment was rendered negligently. Thus, the party loses the ability to
seek and obtain redress although he or she acted diligently. This
clearly impairs an individual's right to recovery for injury in violation
of article I, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution. 4
Rule 9(j) also violates the due process guarantee of the federal
Constitution. 5 The statute denies an injured individual the opportu-
nity to recover for an injury wrongfully and negligently inflicted by
another solely because he or she lacks funds to comply with a filing
requirement.8 6 Due process proscribes a state from denying access to
the courts simply because an individual cannot pay a filing fee.8 7 To
one who is unable to afford an expert to certify his or her claim, Rule
9(j) functions just as a filing fee - preventing access to the courts.
B. Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions
In addition to the impracticalities Rule 9(j) presents, the certifica-
tion requirement also violates the equal protection clauses of both the
82. 146 N.C. App. at 345, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (holding "due process
prohibits a state from denying, solely because of inability to pay filing fee, access to
the courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriage").
87. See id.
2003] 227
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federal and state constitutions.8 The United States Supreme Court
has created a three-tiered test for determining whether a statute vio-
lates the guarantees afforded by the Constitution. 9 Under the first
tier, a statute will be reviewed under the highest level of scrutiny, strict
scrutiny, when the classification it creates infringes upon the exercise
of a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.90
Fundamental rights are those guaranteed, either explicitly or implic-
itly, by the state or federal constitution,9 or those deeply entrenched
"in the traditions of our people. '92 To survive a constitutional attack,
the statutory classification must be essential to promoting a "compel-
ling" state interest.93 Regulations restricting fundamental rights must
be narrowly tailored to obtain "only the legitimate state interests at
stake."'94  The second tier subjects statutory classifications that
infringe upon interests, important "but not quite fundamental," to an
intermediate level of scrutiny. 95 Regulations reviewed under intermedi-
ate scrutiny must be "substantially related to" achieving an important
state objective to survive an equal protection review.96 Statutory classi-
fications affecting interests not addressed under the first two tiers
must only be rationally related to accomplishing a legitimate state
interest.97
Rule 9(j) infringes upon a fundamental right, the right to have
open access to the courts. 98 Not only is the right to have open access
to courts guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, but it is
also rooted in the Magna Carta and entrenched in the traditions of our
people.99 Accordingly, it is subject to the highest level of equal protec-
tion review, strict scrutiny analysis. 00 Preventing frivolous lawsuits
and ensuring the continued availability of reduced health care and
medical malpractice insurance to citizens and healthcare providers,
respectively, are compelling state interests.10' However, more nar-
88. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
89. 63 N.C. App. 592, 602, 306 S.E.2d 477, 483 (1983).
90. Id.
91. Comer v. Ammons, 135 N.C. App. 531, 539, 522 S.E.2d 77, 82 (1999).
92. Id.
93. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
94. Id.
95. 63 N.C. App. at 602, 306 S.E.2d 48 (1983).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See 146 N.C. App. at 345, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
99. See John V. Orth, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION 54 (1993).
100. See 63 N.C. App. at 602, 306 S.E.2d at 483.
101. See Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 637, 325 S.E.2d 469, 477 (1985).
[Vol. 25:219228
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rowly tailored methods exist to attain those objectives. Instituting
medical review panels' °2 and imposing sanctions, similar to those
imposed by Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,10 3
on attorneys and plaintiffs who pursue unsubstantiated, unmeritori-
ous claims would "weed out frivolous medical malpractice claims" at
an early stage of litigation without violating a constitutional right.
10 4
The aforementioned alternative methods would reduce litigation and
allow the state to promote another compelling interest, protecting the
rights of patients to be compensated, without undue burden, for harm
they received due to medical negligence. Because there are less restric-
tive means to achieve the state's interest, Rule 90) is overbroad and
unconstitutional. 
0 5
1. Response to the alleged medical malpractice crisis - a compelling
state interest?
In determining whether the purported medical malpractice crisis
was adequate justification for infringing upon the fundamental right of
access to courts, the actual severity of frivolous medical malpractice
lawsuits must be evaluated. Rule 90) was enacted in response to the
medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's.1°6 However, there is substan-
tial evidence that "the medical malpractice crisis was more feigned
than real."'10 7 Evidence indicates that the malpractice insurance indus-
102. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
103. N.C. R. Civ. P. 11 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Signing by Attorney - Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in his individual name . .. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he had read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for an improper purpose .... If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court .... shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-I, Rule 11 (1999).
104. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
105. See State v. Hines, 122 N.C. App. 545, 552, 471 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1996) ("a law
is void on its face if it sweeps within its ambit not solely activity that is subject to
governmental control, but also includes within its prohibition, the practice of a
protected constitutional right").
106. 312 N.C. 626 at 631, 325 S.E.2d. at 473.
107. 63 N.C. App. at 599, 306 S.E.2d at 481.
20031 229
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try "overstated the reserves set aside for reported claims."' 8 For
example, in 1974, a task force from the state insurance department
evaluated St. Paul Insurance Company's claims files after the company
requested an eighty-two percent rate hike for North Carolina.' 0 9
Examiners found that "claims reserves for claims actually paid were
overstated by 33 percent, and that 19 percent of all reserves were held
for claims which were settled without payment."' 0
During the early part of 1975 through 1978, America "was suffer-
ing a crisis in the availability of malpractice insurance because insur-
ers" believed they were being inadequately paid for the risk they
bore."' However, during this period of purported inadequate com-
pensation, the St. Paul Insurance Company received 415 million dol-
lars in malpractice premiums, but only paid out 27 million dollars in
claims and claims-settlement expenses. 1 2 In the fall of 1978, a St.
Paul executive announced to the Conference of Insurance Legislators,
"an association of state legislators, that St. Paul had lost money in
medial malpractice throughout 1975, but that the line had been 'gener-
ally profitable' during 1976 and 1977." 113 This information "was
based on estimates and assumption, presumably made in good faith,
that only time could corroborate.""' 4 When the executive addressed
the Conference of Insurance Legislators, St. Paul had received 52.7 mil-
lion dollars in premiums for 1975, but had only paid out about 6 mil-
lion dollars for claims. 1 5 At the end of 1980, it appeared that 1975
had been much more profitable than projected. St. Paul had expended
15.5 million dollars in losses and legal fees with an estimated 9.2 mil-
lion dollars remaining to be paid. 1 6 The company had collected 52.7
million dollars in premiums." l 7 Although losses and the correspond-
ing expenses had increased to 78 million dollars from 1975 to 1978,
the combined premiums for this period equaled 415 million dollars." 8
"Even after a hefty $87 million in selling and administrative expense,
that still left a quarter of a billion dollars."" 9
108. 63 N.C. App. at 600, 306 S.E.2d at 482.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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RULE 90)
A report by the North Carolina Professional Liability Insurance
Study Commission provides further support that the medical malprac-
tice crisis was exaggerated. 120 The Study Commission was comprised
of two physicians, two insurance company representatives, a hospital
administrator, and a pharmacist. 12' The Study explicitly stated that a
medical malpractice crisis did not exist in North Carolina. 122 To sup-
port this proposition, the Study emphasized that the St. Paul Insurance
Company, North Carolina's sole malpractice insurer, had not lost a
medical malpractice action, when tried before a jury, in North Caro-
lina in approximately twenty years.123 The Study further asserted that
insurance pricing was the only problem North Carolina was experienc-
ing.124 Inflated pricing was not caused by excessive litigation in North
Carolina, but by losses in states which had a more severe propensity
for litigation and by investment losses the St. Paul Insurance Company
had incurred similar to losses "suffered by other corporate investors
during this period of national economic instability and uncer-
tainty. '12 ' The Commission Report also noted that as soon as a com-
peting malpractice insurer-Medical Mutual Insurance Co.-was
created, St. Paul Insurance Company no longer threatened to leave
North Carolina. 126 In light of the foregoing information, it appears
there is nor never was a medical malpractice crisis to provide a compel-
ling justification for infringing upon the fundamental right of access to
the courts.
2. Opposition to the strict scrutiny analysis employed by the
Anderson Court
The dissent in Anderson erringly asserts that Rule 9(j) infringes
upon the right to file a medical malpractice claim, not the right to have
open access to courts.127 Because the right to file a malpractice claim
is not a fundamental right and the statutory classification does not
discriminate against a suspect class, the dissent analyzed the certifica-
tion requirement under a rational basis review.'1 2  The dissent con-
cluded that Rule 9(j) bore a rational relationship to a legitimate
120. See 63 N.C. App. at 600, 306 S.E.2d at 482.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 63 N.C. App. at 600, 306 S.E.2d at 482.
126. Id.
127. See 146 N.C. App. at 348, 553 S.E.2d at 70.
128. 146 N.C. App. at 349, 553 S.E.2d at 70.
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government interest. 129 Therefore, the classification and the resulting
difference in treatment under the law complied with both federal and
state equal protection clauses. 1
30
Even if the dissent properly determined that the right at issue was
filing a medical malpractice claim, Rule 9(j) would not survive a
rational basis review. No reasonable basis exists, in light of the enor-
mous amount of evidence indicating that the medical malpractice
insurance crisis was feigned, for distinguishing between individuals
seeking to file a medical malpractice action and those seeking to file a
non-medical malpractice action. The government's interest in prevent-
ing frivolous lawsuits is not limited to medical malpractice actions. In
the absence of extenuating circumstances (a legitimate medical mal-
practice insurance crisis, for example), the government should forward
its interest by treating similarly situated individuals evenhandedly. By
burdening only medical malpractice plaintiffs with the pre-certifica-
tion requirement, Rule 90) discriminates against similarly situated
individuals and does not equally protect their access to the courts. 131
Because there is not even a rational basis for the distinction and the
discrimination that results, Rule 90) fails rational basis scrutiny. 132
IV. GOOD OR BAD LAW?
A. Assessment of Holding Rule 90) Unconstitutional
The Anderson holding makes good law. Establishing Rule 90) as
unconstitutional prevents the General Assembly from restricting, and
in some situations entirely barring, an injured party's right to redress
for an injury committed against them, a right guaranteed by both the
federal and state constitutions. Because the opinion and reasoning are
clear and sound, trial courts would be able to consistently apply the
Anderson holding with no difficulty.
B. Unconstitutionality of Rule 9(j) - Implications for Other Statutes
Protecting
1. Physicians and medical malpractice insurers
Rule 9(j) is only one of a series of statues, entitled the North Caro-
lina Medical Malpractice Actions law, that North Carolina enacted in
response to the perceived medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s. 1 33
129. 146 N.C. App. at 350, 553 S.E.2d at 71.
130. Id.
131. See 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
132. See 63 N.C. App. at 602, 306 S.E.2d at 483.
133. See 312 N.C. at 631, 325 S.E.2d 473.
[Vol. 25:219
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol25/iss2/4
The special medical malpractice legislation was enacted under exten-
sive lobbying from the St. Paul Insurance Company and the medical
industry. 134 The legislation was "aimed at reducing the number of
claims by injured patients and thereby protecting the profits of the
insurers."1 35 In enacting the malpractice legislation, the legislature
relied heavily upon a report submitted by the North Carolina Profes-
sional Liability Insurance Study Commission (1976).136 The Study's
report clearly reveals "that the sole purpose of the legislation was to
avoid valid claims."137 Because protecting insurers' profits is not a
legitimate state interest, many statutes comprising the special medical
malpractice legislation, including Rule 9(j) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
15(c), 138 unconstitutionally shield medical malpractice insurers and
medical professionals from the consequences of negligence. The
repose is an uncompromising and "absolute barrier that prevents a
plaintiffs right of action even before his cause of action may accrue,
which is generally recognized as the point in time when the elements
necessary for a legal wrong coalesce." 13 9 Lowering the statute of
repose reduces the probability that a victim of malpractice will be able
to obtain redress for acts of medical negligence that are not reasonably
discoverable until years after the tort has been committed. Because it
appears that the malpractice crisis was feigned, there is no rational
reason for lowering the statute of repose and further shielding mem-
bers of the medial profession and the malpractice industry.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
Rule 9(j) is unconstitutional, unfortunately the North Carolina
134. 63 N.C. App. at 600, 306 S.E.2d at 482.
135. Id.
136. 63 N.C. App. at 601, 306 S.E.2d at 482.
137. Id.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 provides:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for malpractice
arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services
shall be deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence of the last act of the
defendant giving rise to the cause of action: Provided that whenever there is
bodily injury to the person, [or] economic or monetary loss . . . which
originates under circumstances making the injury, [or] loss not readily
apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, and the injury, [or] loss is
discovered or should reasonably be discovered by the claimant two or more
years after the occurrence of the last act. of the defendant giving rise to the
cause of action, suit must be commenced within one year form the date
discovery is made ... [tin no event shall an action be commenced more than
four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1999).
139. 312 N.C. at 626, 640, 326 S.E.2d 469, 480 (1985).
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Supreme Court chose to "punt" instead of addressing the controversial
issue by vacating the Court of Appeals decision. The Court of Appeals
ruling had the potential to encourage courts to hold unconstitutional
other statutes within the North Carolina Medical Malpractice Actions
law that infringe upon an injured party's constitutional rights. The
court's rejection of the statute properly represented the current socie-
tal viewpoint that members of the medical profession should be held
accountable for their negligence to the same extent as everyone else
and that insurers' profits should not trump patients' rights; neither the
medical profession nor the malpractice insurance industry should be
afforded special privileges at the patient's expense.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated
the Court of Appeals decision in Anderson, Rule 90) is unconstitu-
tional.1 40 Requiring a plaintiff in a medial malpractice action to certify
in the complaint that the medical treatment has been evaluated by a
person who is "reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness
and is willing to testify that the care did not comply with applicable
standard of care" 14 1 impairs and unduly burdens the filing of a medi-
cal malpractice claim."'' 42  The requirement is an undue burden
because it places "a substantial obstacle in the path of a party seeking
to exercise her constitutional right."143 Moreover, the pre-certification
requirement violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the federal
and state constitutions because it is not the least restrictive means
available for addressing the state's interest in preventing frivolous med-
ical malpractice lawsuits. 144 Because alternative, more narrowly tai-
lored methods exist that would proscribe the filing of frivolous claims,
Rule 9(j) unconstitutionally discriminates against individuals seeking
redress for medical malpractice. The next time the Supreme Court has
the opportunity to address Rule 9(j)'s constitutionality, it should do so
head on and follow the holding, of the now vacated decision, in
Anderson.
LeVonda Wood
140. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (1999).
142. See 146 N.C. App. at 345, 553 S.E.2d at 68.
143. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69, 69.
144. 146 N.C. App. at 346, 553 S.E.2d at 69.
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